Probabilistic counters are well known tools often used for space-efficient set cardinality estimation. In this paper we investigate probabilistic counters from the perspective of preserving privacy. We use standard, rigid differential privacy notion. The intuition is that the probabilistic counters do not reveal too much information about individuals, but provide only general information about the population. Thus they can be used safely without violating privacy of individuals. It turned out however that providing a precise, formal analysis of privacy parameters of probabilistic counters is surprisingly difficult and needs advanced techniques and a very careful approach.
Introduction
Probabilistic counters are algorithms used for space-efficent representation of cardinality of some dynamically counted events. We would like to indicate occurence of n events using very small (much less than log n) number of bits. We assume that n is unknown in advance and may change. Clearly a simple information-theoretic argument convince us that is not feasible if we demand exact representation of the number of events. Nevertheless there are some very efficient solutions that require only Θ(log log n) bits and guarantee sufficient accuracy for a wide range of applications. Probabilistic counters are well known in the literature since the seminal Morris' paper [1] followed by its thorough mathematical analysis by Flajolet in [2] . They are used as building blocks in many space-efficent algorithms in the field of data mining, network exploration or smart metering to mention a few.
In this paper we investigate probabilistic counters from the privacy-protection perspective. Our analysis is based on differential privacy notion commonly considered as the only state-of-the-art approach. Differential privacy has the undeniable advantage of being mathematically rigorous and formally provable in contrary to previous anonymity-derived privacy definitions. This approach to privacy-preserving protocols can be used to give formal guarantee for privacy resilient to any form of postprocessing. For survey about differential privacy properties see [3] and references therein. Analysis of protocols based on differential privacy is usually technically much more involved comparing with previous approaches, but by using it we are immune against various attacks (see for example in [4, 5] ).
Informally, the idea behind differential privacy is as follows: for two "neighbouring" scenarios that differ only on participation of a single user, a differentially private mechanism shall provide a response chosen from very similar distributions. In effect, judging by the output of the mechanism one cannot say if a given individual was taken into account for producing a given output. Intuitively, probabilistic counters should provide high level of differential privacy, since statistically many various number of events are "squeezed" into a small space of possible output results. Nevertheless, the question about the exact parameters remains open. Moreover, there is a problem for small values of n, when one can distinguish it from "neighbouring" cases with n − 1 and n + 1 with significant probability knowing the value of the counter. In our paper we provide a very precise analysis of probabilistic counters from the perspective of preserving privacy. It turned out that this task is surprisingly non-trivial from the mathematical point of view.
Our primary motivation is to find possibly accurate privacy parameters of two most fundamental probabilistic counter protocols, namely Morris Counter [1] and MaxGeo Counter [6] . Note that the second one is used for yet another popular algorithm -HyperLogLog [7] . We claim that a proved, high precision analysis in the case of probabilistic counters is particularly important since even a mechanism with a very good privacy parameters may cause a serious privacy breach when used multiple times (see e.g. [3] ). Clearly, probabilistic counters in realistic scenarios may be used many times as a very fundamental primitive and a subroutine in more complex protocols.
We also show that they can be used safely without any additional randomization, even in a very demanding settings. It is commonly known that no deterministic algorithm can provide non-trivial differential privacy. Probabilistic counters, however, possess inherent randomness, which can be utilized to achieve desired privacy parameters. In other words, one can say that probabilistic counters are safe by design and we do not need any additional privacy oriented methods. In particular existing, working implementations do not need to be changed if we start demanding a provable privacy of a system.
Finally we demonstrate how our results can be used for constructing a data aggregation protocol based on probabilistic counters that can be used in some specific scenarios.
Paper structure and results
The results of our paper are as follows:
• We prove that Morris Counter provides (L(n), 0.00033)-DP, where L(n) = − ln 1 − 16 n ≈ 16 n (Theorem 1 in Section 4). In Observation 1 we also show that constant 16 cannot be improved.
• We prove that MaxGeo Counter provides (ε, δ)-DP if counter value is at least n
, where l ε = log 1 + 1 ε (Theorem 5 in Section 4).
• We construct a privacy-preserving distributed survey protocol based on probabilistic counters in Section 5.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Firstly, in Section 2 we recall differential privacy definition. In Section 3 we recall both Morris and MaxGeo counters and propose a general definition for probabilistic counter (Definition 2). Moreover, we state Fact 1 which is a useful reformulation of the standard differential privacy definition for probabilistic counters. Our most important technical contribution is presented in Section 4. We analyse how both counters behave under differential privacy regime. For the sake of clarity some proofs are moved to the Appendix. In Section 5 we demonstrate how probabilistic counter can be used for constructing a data aggregation protocol in very particular, yet natural, scenario. In Section 6 we recall work related to our paper. Finally, in Section 7 we present conclusions and future work propositions.
Differential Privacy Preliminaries
In this section we briefly recall differential privacy. For more details see for example [3] . Note also, that we will denote the set of natural numbers by N and the set of all integers by Z. Moreover, let N 0 = N ∪ {0}. We assume that there exists a trusted curator who holds, or securely obtains, the data of individuals in a (possibly distributed) database x. Let the number of rows be N . Every row consists of the data of some individual. By X we denote the space of all possible rows. The goal is to protect the data of every single individual, even if all users except one collude with the Adversary to breach privacy of this single, uncorrupted user. On the other hand, the curator is responsible for producing a release -a possibly accurate response to a requested query. This response is then released to the public, which is allowed to perform statistical analysis on it. Differential privacy is by design resilient to post-processing attacks, so even if the Adversary obtains the public release, he will not be able to infer anything about specific individuals participating in that release.
A privacy mechanism is a randomized algorithm used by the curator that takes as input a database, and produces the output (the release) using randomization.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy (formulation from [3] )). A randomized algorithm M with domain N |X | is (ε, δ)-differentially private, if for all S ⊆ Range(M) and for all x, y ∈ N |X | such that x − y 1 1 the following condition is satisfied:
where the probability space is over the outcomes of the mechanism M. An intuition of (ε, δ)-DP is as follows: if we choose two consecutive databases (that differ exactly on one record), then the mechanism is very likely to return indistinguishable values. In other words, it preserves privacy with high probability, but it is admissible for mechanism to be out of control with negligible probability δ.
Probabilistic Counters
Throughout this paper we focus on probabilistic counters, denoted further by M . It is a stochastic process that can be interpreted in terms of a mechanism, defined on a space of all possible inputs.
Each increase of the data source which is being counted by the probabilistic counter is called an incrementation request. Due to randomized nature of probabilistic counters it may increase the value of the counter, but not necessarily. We will also denote the incrementation request by '1'. For generality, we also assume that the counter can get as an input '0', and in such case it simply does nothing. This is useful for some real-life scenarios, specifically data aggregation (see Section 5) . Obviously only incrementation requests are impacting the final result of the counter, hence we indicate the value of the counter after n incrementation requests by M n .
Note that in general, one can define probabilistic counter in the following way Definition 2. We call stochastic process M a probabilistic counter if
where M n is the value of the counter after n incrementation requests, X(M n ) is a random variable, possibly dependent on M n and f is an abritrary, nonnegative function.
Note that, using this definition, any probabilistic counter can be described with a tuple {M 0 , (f (·, ·), X(M n ))}.
In the Figure 1 one can see graphical representation of probabilistic counter. By 1 we denote the incrementation request and 0 denotes '0' input, therefore no incrementation request. The dice denotes the randomness (namely X(M n )) from Definition 2. We emphasize that the probabilistic counter depends on the number of incrementation requests. We would like to show that if we reveal the final result it will not expose any sensitive data about any single record. Moreover, note that if x and y differs only by one '0' input, then P (M (x) ∈ S) = P (M n ∈ S) = P (M (y) ∈ S), where n is the number of incrementation requests both in x and y. See that then the condition in Definition 1 is trivially fulfilled. Hence for our convenience, when describing probabilistic counters in terms of differential privacy, we use to mark only the number of incrementation requests provided by individuals which we denote by M n for n incrementation requests. We present the following Fact 1. Let M be a probabilistic counter which takes values from a discrete set A. Moreover assume that there exists such S ⊂ A that for all n, m 1 such that |n−m| 1 and for all s ∈ S
and
Then M is (ε, δ)-DP.
Note that, for our setting, this is fully compatible with the regular differential privacy (Definition 1).
Morris Counter
We begin with a short description of Morris Counter (originally refered as an approximate counter [1, 2] 
Algorithm 1: Morris Counter Algorithm
Roughly speaking, we start with M = 1. Each incoming incrementation request triggers a random event. This event increments the counter (M ← M + 1) with probability 1 a M . Note that this approximate counting protocol can be easily distributed. Indeed, any entity who wants to increment the counter, only has to send the request to increment it and these requests will be queued on the server and resolved one after another. A detailed description of the approximate counting method can be found in [1, 2] . Throughout this article we examine only a standard Morris Counter, i.e. with a = 2. 
for any l ∈ N and n ∈ N 0 .
Note that Definition 3 can be derived directly from a run of Algorithm 1. From now on let P (M n = l) = p n,l . Directly from Definition 3 we attain the following functional recursion:
for l ∈ N and n ∈ N 0 with starting and boundary conditions p 0,1 = 1, p 0,l = 0 for l 2 and p n,0 = 0 for n ∈ N 0 .
Accuracy versus Differential Privacy. The accuracy of Morris Counter has been thoroughly analysed in various classical papers. First detailed analysis was proposed by Philippe Flajolet in [2] . Here we present an essence of theorems presented in [2] , that occur to get a foothold in the considerations of this Morris Counter in terms of Differential Privacy: 
which will emerge as a crucial point of our further considerations of this Markov process in terms of DP in Section 4.
MaxGeo Counter
We begin with a short description of MaxGeo counter. Algorithm 2 shows its pseudocode. Speaking informally, for each incrementation request the server has to generate a random variable from Geo( 1 2 ) distribution. Final result is the maximum taken over all these generated random variables. The expectation and variance of a maximum of n i.i.d. geometric variables have already been analysed in the literature, and it turns out they have satisfying concentration properties (see [6] ).
add r to C; 5 return max(C); Algorithm 2: MaxGeo Counter Algorithm
HyperLogLog
The maximum of geometric variables is used as a primitive in well known Hyper-LogLog algorithm (see [7] ), therefore its privacy properties are important both from theoretical and practical point of view. See that essentially in HyperLogLog we have k independent MaxGeo counters M [1], . . . , M [k] and for each incrementation request we choose one of the counters uniformly at random. Let us denote the chosen counter by M [j]. Then we generate random variable with X ∼ Geo( 1 2 ) distribution and update M [j] := max(M [j], X). The final estimation is
where α k is a constant dependent only on k ([7]).
Probabilistic Counters Privacy Properties

Morris Counter Privacy
In this subsection we investigate Morris Counter in terms of (ε, δ)-DP in order to obtain beneath Theorem 1. Let M denote the Morris Counter and assume |n − m| 1. Then
To do so, we take the following steps. First we consider a concentration of Morris Counter in the vicinity of its mean value. More precisely, we show that Morris Counter after n incrementation requests takes values in relatively small intervals I n with probability 1 − δ (then M n satisfies the condition (2) for S(n) = I n ), where δ is some small constant arised from the proof. Note that I n may be interpreted as confidence intervals at level 1 − δ (see e.g. [8] ). Afterwards, we provide some lemmas which enable us to establish a curtailment of ε(n) parameter in formula (1) in interval I n for n > 2 7 .
Finally we obtain analogous results for smaller number of incrementation requests n.
A foregoing Theorem, provided by Flajolet, comes to the fore in an accomplishment of those goals: Theorem 2 (Proposition 1 from [2] ). The probability p n,l that the Morris Counter has value l after n incrementation requests is
Notice that Theorem 2 presents an explicit formula for P (M n = l), which (as we may experience in Appendix A) is not handful to analyze. However it is yet simple enough to find the values numerically (also note that recursive Definition 3 provides those probabilities as well, but this approach is not efficient in terms of memory and time for big number of requests n). We avail ourselves of Theorem 2 in all technical proofs of lemmas in Appendix A.
Let us commence with a few facts about the concentration of the distribution of the random variable M n : Lemma 1. Let M n be the state of the Morris Counter after n incrementation requests. Then
Let M n be the state of the Morris Counter after n incrementation requests. Then
The proofs of both lemmas 1 and 2 are presented in Appendix A.
Theorem 3. The state of the Morris Counter after n incrementation requests is not in a set I n with probability δ < 0.00033.
PROOF. Realize that P (M n ∈ [1 : n + 1]) = 1. This observation, together with lemmas 1 and 2 bears a conclusion that
In the second part, we try to establish ε(n) parameter of DP of M n . It remains to examine the property (1) in the interval I n . Therefore, we are interested in finding an upper bound for maximal privacy loss for any n ∈ N and k ∈ I n :
Actually, we may consider + sign instead of ± in (4), because | ln(x)| = | ln( 1 x )|. However, when I n = I n±1 , we have to behave carefully, so in particular, an additional check of privacy loss with − sign is needed when n is of a form 2 l + 1 for some l ∈ N.
The above claim is a result of a simple application of Lemma 6 from Appendix A.
Claim 2. If for any given n, there exists an ascending and positive sequence (α i ) n i=1 such that (∀ i ∈ [1 : n]) p n,i = 2 i α i p n,i+1 , then there also exists an ascending and positive sequence (α i ) n+1 i=1 such that
This claim emerges from lemmas 7 and 8 from Appendix A. We use Claim 2 to guarantee starting conditions for the next Lemma 3. Hence we would like to gather some information about the distribution of M 2 7 +1 . More precisely we are interested in a behaviour of θ i = p129,i p129,i+1 for i 11 (presented in the Table 1 ). In the Table 1 we roughly see a superexponential trend of proportions θ i , so we are able to use Claim 2 for n 2 7 + 1. It might seem that the choice of n is arbitrary, but it occurs that a distribution of M 2 6 +1 does not have necessary properties of privacy loss. Lemma 3. Let l ∈ N and n = 2 l−1 . If p n+1,l+c−1 2 c+3 p n+1,l+c for every c in an interval [−l + 1 : 4], then
PROOF. Realize that for c = −l + 1, the demanded inequality is trivial. Therefore we can safely consider c ∈ [−l + 2 : 4] and any N n + 1 with an assumption that
The thesis is an upshot of an appropriate application of inductions. Claims 1 and 2, together with Table 1 enable us to apply Lemma 3 for n = 2 k + 1 for any k 7.
Theorem 4. Let n > 2 7 = 128 and k ∈ I n . Then
PROOF. According, to the previous discussion about formula (4), we examine:
Let l = log(n) and c = k − l ∈ [−4 : 4] . Then Lemma 3 bears
n .
If n = 2 l−1 + 1 for some l ∈ N, then a little adjustment is neccesary. Indeed, let now c − 1 = k − l ∈ [−4 : 4], and once again, Lemma 3 provides p n−1,k−1 p n−1,k < 2 c+2 . However, it still holds that:
On the other hand, we obviously have (4)). However, in the Figure 2 we may briefly see that the above inequality is true for smaller number of requests n as well.
Having all the technical lemmas, we are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
PROOF. Suppose that S(n) = I n in Fact 1. Then from theorems 3 and 4 we can easily see that P (M (x) / ∈ S(n)) < 0.00033 and
hence from Fact 1 we obtain the main result.
In the Figure 2 we may perceive that values of ε(n) are strictly between − ln(1− 8 n ) and − ln(1 − 16 n ) for n ∈ [17 : 160] . We can also observe that ε(n) ≈ 2 4− log(n) in this interval. Remark that log(n) 4 for n 16, so log(n) − 4 < 1, but M is always positive. This can be discerned as a reason of chaotic behaviour of the process for n 16. Nevertheless, Figure 2 affirms the quality of ε(n) parameter established in Theorem 1. Moreover, we present the following 
MaxGeo Counter Privacy
In this subsection we present a theorem which shows the privacy guarantees of the MaxGeo Counter. Assume that we have n incrementation requests. In case of MaxGeo Counter, it means that the we generate random variables X 1 , . . . , X n , where X i ∼ Geo( 1 2 ) are pairwise independent. Ultimately the result of the counter is the maximum over all X i 's, namely X = max(X 1 , . . . , X n ). We present the following Theorem 5. Let M denote the MaxGeo counter and n denote the number of incrementation requests. Consider m such that |n − m| 1. Fix ε > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1) and let l ε = log 1 + 1 ε .
If n ln(δ)
then
PROOF. We have n incrementation requests for MaxGeo counter M , which means that the result of the mechanism is X = max(X 1 , . . . , X n ), where X i ∼ Geo( 1 2 ) are pairwise independent. First we observe that if n = m then the counter trivially satisfies differential privacy, as the probability distribution of X does not change at all. From now on we assume that |n − m| = 1. See that
Now we need to calculate the following expression
For fixed ε value we need to satisfy the following inequality ln P (max(X 1 , ...X n ) = l) P (max(X 1 , ...X n , X n+1 ) = l) ε , which gives the following
From (6) we can see that the greater l is, the smaller ε can be. Moreover, inequality (6) is true for l l ε . Therefore, we have to assure that P (X l ε ) δ. See that
It is easy to see that the above decreases when n increases. Then
.
Ultimately it means that for fixed privacy parameters (ε, δ) we can calculate the minimum number of incrementation requests that is necessary to satisfy given privacy parameters. This can be done by artificially adding them before actually collecting data. Of course it would have to be taken into account during calculating the actual estimation of number of counts and it can have an impact on the precision of the estimations. See that if we can perform such a preprocessing, then for every (ε, δ) we can easily know how many artificial counts have to be added.
Note that from differential privacy perspective, HyperLogLog is an arbitrary postprocessing performed on k MaxGeo counters. Moreover, as each response goes to one counter only, they are independent from each other, which means that we can use parallel composition theorem (see [3] ). This gives us the following 
Comparison of Morris and MaxGeo Counters Privacy Properties
In this subsection we show comparison for both counters privacy properties. See that for fixed δ and n we may obtain from Theorem 5 that
From now on, we may assume that ε(n) is exactly the right hand side of (7) . In order to limit it we may consider:
so ε(n) ψ(n, δ) = − ln(δ) n + O(n −2 ). We would like to find out whether ε(n + 1) = ε(n) to establish an upper bound for this parameter. Consider a situation when ε(m − 1) = ε(m). We search for a minimal n such that ε(n) = ε(m − 1). Then
Assume that τ (n 0 (n, δ)) = 2τ (n, δ). Remark that n 0 (n, δ) can be derived precisely using W-Lambert special function (see [9] for a definition and properties), however the exact form of n 0 (n, δ) is redundant in order to attain
Hence, in case of δ = 0.00033, we attain Realize that the above conclusions remain true if δ(n) is not constant. This short observation enable us to obtain a more general result:
n c for some constant c > 0. Then ε(n) φ(n, δ(n)) = 2c ln(n) n + 3c 2 ln(n) 2 n 2 + O c 3 ln(n) 3 n 3
and MaxGeo Counter is (φ(n, δ(n)), δ(n))-DP for any n ∈ N. Both sequences of parameters tends to 0, which may be used as an advantage when an expected number of incrementation requests D is very large. However, we emphasize that this requires δ(n) to be negligible.
Privacy-Preserving Survey via Probabilistic Counters
In this section we present an example scenario for data aggregation using probabilistic counters. We assume there is a server (alternatively we call it aggregator) and a collection of nodes (e.g. mobile phone users) and we want to perform a boolean survey with a sensitive question. Namely, each user sends '0' if his/her answer is no and '1' if the answer is yes. We assume that the connections between users and the server are perfectly secure and the data can safely get to the trusted server. This can be performed using standard cryptography solutions. The goal of the server is to publish the sum of all '1' responses in a privacy-preserving way. Such goal could obviously be achieved by simply collecting all the data and adding an, appropriately calibrated, Laplace noise (see [3] ), but we aim to show that probabilistic counters have inherently sufficient randomness to be differentially private, without any auxilliary randomizing mechanism.
We can present the general scenario in the following way:
1. each user sends his/her bit of data to the server using secure channels, 2. server plugs the data points sequentially into the counter, 3. if the data point is '1', the counter receives incrementation request, otherwise, the data is ignored, 4. each incrementation request is being processed by the counter and may lead (depending on randomness) to an increase of the value of the counter, 5. after all data is processed, the value of the counter is released to the public.
Note that we assume that the Adversary has access only to the released value. See also that we released just the counter value itself, which is not actually an estimation of '1' responses. Such estimation is a function of released value, which is different for Morris or MaxGeo Counter and there also can be various ways to estimate the actual number using counter value. However, this does not really matter for our case, as differential privacy is, conveniently, fully resilient to post-processing (see [3] ). The graphical depiction of our considered scenario is presented in the Figure 4 . Figure 4 : Scenario for data aggregation using probabilistic counters. We assume that the Adversary does not have any way to extract information from within the rectangle.
Adversary. Our assumptions about the Adversary are the same as in most differential privacy papers. Namely, he may collude with any subset of the participants (e.g. all except the single user whose privacy he wants to breach). On the other hand, the aggregator is trusted. See that even though we have a distributed system in mind, this is, in fact, a central differential privacy scenario. We do not assume pan-privacy.
It means that the internal state of the algorithm is not subject to the constraints of differential privacy. Obviously if the adversary would know the internal state of the counter at any time or could observe whether after receiving data from specific user the server has to perform computations to potentially increment the counter (implying a '1' response) or not, he would easily violate the privacy. We also do not assume privacy under continual observation, the survey is not published iteratively, but one time only, after it is finished. To sum it up, the Adversary cannot
• extract or tamper with the internal state of the counter,
• extract any information from the server or channels between users and server.
The Adversary can
• collude with any subset C of the participants (e.g. know their data or make them all send '0' to the server) in order to breach privacy of user not belonging to C,
• obtain the final result of the aggregation and perform any desired post-processing on it.
Note that, in light of our theorems 1 and 5 both Morris Counter and MaxGeo Counter preserve differential privacy in such scenario. Assume we have at least n users holding '1', therefore at least n incrementation requests. See that we can either know it based on domain knowledge (e.g. we expect that at least some fraction of users will send '1' based on similar surveys) or add artificial n counts to the counter initially. Obviously, in case of artificial counts it has to be taken into account when estimating the final sum. Using Morris Counter we obtain (L(n), 0.00033)-DP with L(n) = − ln 1 − 16 n 16 n−8 . We present the following Example 2. Assume we have at least n = 200 incrementation requests. After using Theorem 1, we have L(n) 16 n−8 0.08334. Therefore, using Morris Counter, the survey presented above is (0.08334, 00033)-DP.
On the other hand, using MaxGeo Counter for given ε and δ we get (ε, δ)-DP as long as n ln(δ) ln(1− 1 2 lε )
, where l ε = log 1 + 1 ε . Here we present an example. Example 3. Let ε = 0.5 and δ = 1 D 2 , where D is the the number of all survey participants. After using our theorem and straightforward calculations we have n 7 ln(D) .
Say we will have e 20 participants. Then if we have at least 140 incrementation requests, we satisfy (0.5, 1 D 2 )-DP.
Previous and Related Work
In our paper we take a different perspective on probabilistic counters. Namely, we focus on their inherent privacy guarantees in the sense of differential privacy. The idea of differential privacy has been introduced for the first time in [10] , however its precise formulation in the widely used form appeared in [11] . There is a long list of papers concerning differential privacy, e.g. [12, 13, 14] . Most of these papers focus on a centralised model, namely a database with trusted party holding it. See that in our paper, despite the distributed setting, we have the same trust model. There is a party called curator that is entitled to gather and see all participants' data in the clear and releases the computed data to wider (possibly untrusted) audience. Comprehensive information concerning differential privacy can be found in [3] .
The idea of probabilistic counters, along with the well known Morris Counter was presented in the seminal paper [1] . Very detailed analysis by Flajolet can be found in [2] . MaxGeo Counter was first proposed and analysed in [6] . More detailed and precise analysis can be found in [15] . Most important application of MaxGeo Counter can be found in [7] , where the authors propose the well-known HyperLogLog algorithm. It's practical applications are widely described in [16] .
Probabilistic counters were previously considered in terms of privacy preservation for set cardinality estimators. The authors of [17] show that in the scenario of using probabilistic counters for set cardinality estimation with the Adversary being able to extract the intermediate values of counter, the privacy is not preserved. Note that, in this paper we perform data aggregation instead of cardinality estimation, moreover we assume the Adversary is not able to extract any intermediate values from the counter. To the best of authors knowledge, probabilistic counters has not been considered for data aggregation under differential privacy regime before.
Unsurprisingly one of the main applications of probabilistic counter is to compute a size of a database or its extraordinary subset. A set of such applications can be found in [18] . In [19] the authors use Morris Counter for online, probabilistic and space efficient counting over streams of fixed, finite length. Authors of [20] proposed an application of a system of Morris Counters for flash memory devices. Another application, presented in [21] , is a revisited version of Morris Counter designed for binary floating-point numbers. In [22] Morris Counter is used in a well-known problem of counting the frequency moments of long data streams. The authors of [23] focused on making probabilistic counters scalable and accurate in concurrent setting. Paper on probabilistic counters in hardware can be found in [24] .
In random graphs theory, Morris Counter is usually connected to greedy structures. For instance, in an arragement of a random labeled graph in Gilbert model G(n, p), it is possible to construct a greedy stable set S n , which size has the same distribution as Morris Counter M n of the base a = (1 − p) −1 (see e.g. [25] or [26] for fundamentals of random graph theory).
There are many other birth processes that are quite similar to Morris Counter, which are applicable in variety of disciplines like biology, physics or theory of random graphs. Short descriptions of such examples can be found in [27] .
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have investigated probabilistic counters from privacy-protection perspective. We have shown that both Morris Counter and MaxGeo Counter have sufficient differential privacy guarantees inherently from the mechanism itself, provided that there is at least a small number incrementation requests. Otherwise the counter has too low value and, intuitively, the result is not randomized enough. We have also shown, that constant in our Morris Counter result cannot be improved further.
We have shown how to perform data aggregation, namely a distributed survey, in a privacy-preserving manner by using probabilistic counters. Note that the security model in this paper was somewhat optimistic. Unfortunately, in such setting there is little incentive to using them, other than the situation when we already have them deployed and working as aggregators. This would, however, change tremendously were we able to weaken these assumptions.This seems a very promising way to continue our research from this paper. Namely, we focused on privacy here, and are still missing the ability to weaken the security assumptions and allow the Adversary to extract information from channels between users and the aggregator. That would put us in the, so called, Local Model, where each user is responsible for the data randomization. However, such approach require us to be able to perform probabilistic counter in an oblivious manner which, to the best of our knowledge, was not explored before.
In Subsection 3.1 we have mentioned about the generalization of Morris Counter (for bases a > 1). Analysis of privacy properties of such variants of Morris Counters and various probabilistic counters presented for example in [21] , [28] may also be promising direction of further research.
Appendix A. Technical Lemmas and Proofs Related to Differential Privacy of Morris Counter
For the sake of completeness, we present here proofs of all technical lemmas that are not directly connected to Theorem 1. Some of computations are supported by Wolfram Mathematica ver. 11.3 ([29] ). Whenever we obtain a result in this manner, we indicate it by W = sign. Usually results are precise, however in some cases, final forms are attained numerically. Let us commence with several definitions used throughout this appendix.
An increasing sequence k i=1 1 − 2 −i −1 that arised in Theorem 2 will be indicated by r k and we denote its limit
We often struggle with expressions of a pattern 1 − 1 y , so we denote this function as a(y) to abbreviate formulas.
The proof of Lemma 1.
PROOF. At first, we want to bound a lower tail of distribution P (M n log(n) − 5). Here we would like to find a sufficient upper limitation for the above probability. Assume that l log(n) − 5. Consider the probability that M n has value l:
Remark that the above restraint is totally useless when l log(n) − 2, so it cannot be employed to obtain a reasonable bound for an symmetrical upper tail. Howewer, the aforementioned formula will help us to limit the left tail of the distribution of M n :
The proof of Lemma 2.
PROOF. Actual goal is to limit an upper tail, that is P (M n log(n) + 5). Consider a process X = (X k , k ∈ [0 : n]). Let X initially follow the incrementation rule P (X k = k + 1) = 1 for k ∈ [0 : log n + 1]. Afterwards, let this Markov chain imitate the transition rule of Morris Counter, that is
for k log(n) + 1. Naturally, for k log(n) + 1, we have X k M k , so we may couple realizations of these two processes in such a way that whenever X is incremented, then so is M and if M does not change, then X does not rise as well (note that X has at most the same probability of a positive incrementation as M at any point of time).
To abbreviate the expressions let us denote m = n − log(n) − 1 and µ c = P (X k+1 = log(n) + c + 1|X k = log(n) + c) = 1 2 log(n) +c = 1 − ν c , for any c ∈ Z. Moreover, let us define a three-dimensional discrete simplex:
The coupling encountered above, ensures us that Be awared that when m < 3 (that is, when n < 7), then the above sums are empty, but on the other hand log(n) + 5 > n + 1, so the inequality is trivially true.
Next two lemmas are useful in a proof of Lemma 6: PROOF. 
Realize a simple fact, that z ln(z) z − 1 for 0 < z 1. Hence
and in a consequence a(2 −s x) 2x+1 < e −2 s+1 for any reasonable s. Moreover, let
Then, in a similar way 
for any reasonable s.
PROOF. Let x = 2 k and t ∈ {0, 1}. In advance we define
Realize that for t ∈ {0, 1} and k 5, |τ (k, t) + κ(k, t)| < 2 −50 < 10 −15 . Now, consider the differences between the consecutive elements of sequences:
Let us define u t = 2 5+t−2i and
and consider an upper bound of the last term:
Note that 2i k + 2 + t, so 8
x u t and in consequence 6u t − 28 x > 20 x > 0. Moreover
Denote the latter lower bound for W t (i) by L t (x; u t (i)). Now we show that W t (i) > 0 for i 1. Indeed, from Inequalities A.1 and A.2 we obtain . Thanks to the property W t (i) > 0 for i 1, we may subtly neutralize the influence of r k+5−i in the considered sum:
Naturally we may consider U 0 (x; u 0 (i)) instead of W 0 (i) numerically for i 4: 2 −i(2i−1) r 2i+1 W 0 (i) −3.53741 · 10 −6 . Moreover we may bound W 0 (i) by a(2 5−2i x) 2x+1 for the rest of the sum: k+2 2 i=5 2 −i(2i−1) r 2i+1 a(2 5−2i x) 2x+1 R 2 −45 e −64 1 − 2 −21 e −192 W = 1.5784 . . . · 10 −41 , so p 2 k+1 +1,k+5 − p 2 k +1,k+4 < 0 for k 15. However, according to Theorem 2, we also present the numerical values of the sequence (p 2 k +1,k+4 ) 14 k=2 in the Table A. 2. We can now easily see that for any k 2 we attained p 2 k+1 +1,k+5 − p 2 k +1,k+4 < 0 . For any possible x 8 (k 3), 1 i=0 2 −i(2i−1) r 2i+1 1.1 1−i L 1 (x; u t (i)) > 0.0015. We already know that W 1 (i) are positive for i > 1, so p 2 k+1 +1,k+6 − p 2 k +1,k+5 > 0 for all k 3.
We may use Theorem 2 once again to see that p 2 6 +1,10 p 2 6 +1,11 W = 129.454 > 2 7 and p 2 7 +1,11 p 2 7 +1,12 W = 125.065 < 2 7 . Together with Lemma 6 we may easily attain Claim 1 and we instantly see that this Claim cannot be extended continously for k < 7.
Lemma 7. Let 2 l n and assume that p n,l−i = 2 2−i α i p n,l−i+1 for i ∈ [0 : 2] and p n+1,l−j = 2 2−j α j p n+1,l−j+1 for j ∈ [0 : 1].
If 0 α 2 < α 1 < α 0 , then 0 < α 1 < α 0 .
PROOF. Realize that p n+1,l−i+1 = p n,l−i+1 (1 − 2 −l+i−1 + 2 −l+2 α i ) for i ∈ [0 : 2], so for j ∈ [0 : 1], α j = p n+1,l−j 2 2−j p n+1,l−j+1 = p n,l−j (1 − 2 −l+j + 2 −l+2 α j+1 ) 2 2−j p n,l−j+1 (1 − 2 −l+j−1 + 2 −l+2 α j ) = α j (1 − 2 −l+j + 2 −l+2 α j+1 ) 1 − 2 −l+j−1 + 2 −l+2 α j .
Assume that α 1 α 0 . Then L := α 1 (1−2 −l+1 +2 −l+2 α 2 )(1−2 −l−1 +2 −l+2 α 0 ) α 0 (1−2 −l +2 −l+2 α 1 ) 2 =: R.
However, contrary to the assumption,
Lemma 8. If for some n ∈ N, p n,n = 2 n η n p n,n+1 and p n+1,n+1 = 2 n+1 η n+1 p n+1,n+2 , then η n < η n+1 .
PROOF. 0 = p n+1,n+1 − 2 n+1 η n+1 p n+1,n+2 = p n,n+1 (1 − 2 −n−1 ) + p n,n 2 −n − η n+1 p n,n+1 = p n,n+1 (1 − 2 −n−1 + η n − η n+1 ) , but 1 − 2 −n−1 > 0, so η n < η n+1 .
